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The dramatic increase in life expectancy at older ages and the trend towards earlier 
withdrawal from the labor force are changing the age composition of the labor force 
in many European countries, but especially in Italy.  The Lisbon targets (2000) set by 
the European Union (EU) have emphasized the importance of increasing labor supply 
by setting an ambitious target participation rate of 70%.  Besides women, the 
segments of the Italian population which are furthest away from this target are the 
youth and the elderly. As for the elderly, the financial incentives of the Italian social 
security system have encouraged retirement at relatively young ages throughout the 
1980’s and part of the 1990’s (Brugiavini Peracchi 2003 and 2007), and only recently 
these trend have shown some sign of reversal.   
 
We have shown in previous work (Brugiavini and Peracchi, 2007) that the welfare 
gains of the elderly are large both in absolute and in relative terms, that is, relative to 
other demographic groups, particularly the young. The issue that we address in this 
paper is whether early exit prompted reductions in the youth unemployment rate, as 
often claimed by union leaders, thus partly compensating for the welfare 
redistribution operated in favour of the elderly. This question necessarily relates to 
the labor market policies enacted during the last decades and the impact that these had 
on the participation rate of younger workers.  The aim of this paper is to analyze the 
interaction of these policies and the social security legislation in shaping the age 
profile of the labor market and the trends in labor force participation.   
 
 
2. Unemployment Trends in Italy 
 
The Italian labor market is characterized by relatively high unemployment rates, 
particularly for the young. The two main characteristics of the youth unemployment 
rate in Italy are (i) an extraordinary regional variability, and (ii) a high percentage of 
first job seekers among young unemployed, particularly in the Southern regions. 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the trend in unemployment rates of young people (aged 20-24) 
between 1977 and 2004, both in aggregate terms and separately for males and 
females. The vertical bars indicate the years of the main reforms in the social security 
system. The youth unemployment rate shows a clear upward trend with a strong 
cyclical component, and reaches a first peak of 28.6% in 1987 and a second peak of 
32.5% in 1998.  It is clear that Italy is a country with a serious youth unemployment 
problem.  
   2
The large variability across regions is documented in Figure 2.2 , which distinguishes 
five regions: North-East (NE), North-West (NW), Center (C), South-East(SE) and 
South-West (SW). While in the Southern regions the unemployment rate for the age 
group 20-24 can be as high as 50%, Northern regions witness youth unemployment 
























Several explanations have been put forward to interpret these figures. One strand of 
the literature looks at the issue of labor mismatch. In particular, some authors have 
explored the hypothesis that the unbalanced evolution of labor demand and supply 
across different geographical areas, i.e. regional mismatch, is partly responsible for 
the increase in aggregate and youth unemployment, particularly in the Southern 
regions.
1  According to this view, the determinants of the regional unemployment 
differential can be seen in the following elements: employment performance in the 
South has worsened in the presence of a sustained labor force growth; labor force 
mobility from the South to the Northern and Central areas has sensibly declined with 
the reduction of earnings differentials and with the increase in social transfers per 
head; real wages in the South are not affected by local unemployment conditions but 
depend on the unemployment rate prevailing in the leading areas, i.e. Northern 
regions (Brunello et al, 2000). In other words, despite the increasing unemployment 
in the South, labor mobility from the South to the North has been low, and relative 
wages have not adjusted to reflect worsened local labor market conditions.  
 
                                                 
1 See Attanasio and Padoa Schioppa (1991), Bodo and Sestito (1991), and Manacorda and 
Petrongolo (2005).   3
Together with the regional mismatch and the lack of geographical mobility, also the 
skill mismatch plays a role in determining high youth unemployment rates in Italy. 
Some authors (see for example Caroleo 1999) stress the fact that, despite the higher 
educational attainments of the new entrants into the labor market, the educational mix 
does not match well the trends in labor demand. 
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Figure 2.3 Trend of Educational Attainments in Italy: Rate of high school 
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Figure 2.3 shows the time trend in the percentage of people with high school diploma 
and university degree among people aged 20-29. This percentage has increased 
sharply over the last 30 years. The percentage of people with high school degrees has 
nearly doubled, from less than 30% in 1977 to almost 60% in 2004. During the same 
period, the percentage of people with university degrees has increased by nearly three 
times, from about 7% to almost 20%.  The increase in the educational attainments of 
the younger cohorts implies a delayed entry into the labor market (Contini, 2005). It 
also gives rise to problems of mismatch between skills supplied and skill demanded. 
The relevance of these problems differs across regions (Caroleo, 1999). In the 
Southern regions the mismatch between skills supplied – often generic and of low 
qualification – and skills demanded is just one of the explanations of youth 
unemployment. In the Northern and Central regions, instead, skill mismatch seems to 
represent the main problem. In this case, employers ask for specialized manual 
workers, whereas young suppliers offer a medium high, but generic, educational 
level. 
  
Another element that has been often considered in explaining the high level of youth 
unemployment in Italy is the high reservation wage of the young, particularly in the 
South. This high reservation wage –  combined with the fact that, particularly in the 
South, the majority of young unemployed are first-job seekers – is surely a relevant 
determinant of the high youth unemployment. It is generally agreed that the absence 
of welfare support for first-job seekers, i.e. the absence of minimum income 
provisions and unemployment benefits, and the strengthening of the role of the family 
have contributed to increase the level of the reservation wage of young job seekers. 
Moreover, particularly in the South, the public sector has represented for long time 
the only access to a “regular” job and young people have built their own human 
capital and their own aspiration on this type on job. Consequently, their reservation 
wage is built on the public sector wages level (Caroleo, 1999).  
 
The existence of a legal minimum wage is usually regarded as a barrier to the 
recruitment of young workers. The situation in Italy represents somewhat of a 
paradox. In fact, Italy has no legal minimum wage. On the other hand wage increases, 
especially in the public sector, depend mainly on seniority. The combination of these 
two features is often viewed as an important cause of the dramatic increase in the 
wage differential between younger and older workers observed during the last two 
decades. Instead of inducing a natural substitution between older and younger 
workers, the existence of this wage differential is often taken as a justification for 
early retirement policies, especially in the case of industries subject to negative 
sectoral shocks, which have only provoked a dramatic exit of older workers with little 
incentives to new entry of younger workers (Contini, 2005).  
 
A very popular explanation for the rigidity of the Italian labor market are its 
institutional features, and especially the strictness of the Italian Employment 
Protection Legislation (EPL). The available empirical evidence about the effects of 
the EPL on aggregate labor dynamics
2 indicates that the EPL affects the composition 
of employment. In particular, countries like Italy where the EPL is stricter tend to 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Bertola (1999).   5
display higher youth unemployment.
3 Figure 2.4 shows the relationship between 
youth unemployment and an index of EPL strictness for some European countries in 
2003. The index we use is Version 2 of the overall EPL strictness index computed by 
the OECD in its 2004 Employment Outlook. Although Italy has been scoring at the 
highest level till the late 1990s, the changes to the temporary employment legislation 
introduced in the last two decades have somewhat lowered its EPL index. Table A1 in 
the Appendix shows the EPL index and its components as computed by the OECD in 
its 1999 and 2004 Employment Outlook. We report data for Italy and a few other 
European countries (France, Germany, Spain, and the UK). It is evident that the 
Italian EPL is particularly restrictive on two dimensions, namely “temporary 
employment” (although things have improved substantially between the late 1980s 




























































The  “young-in-old-out” paradigm has been advocated in Italy mainly by trade 
unions and left-wing parties. With reference to the Social Security reforms of the 
1990’s and the more recent enactment of these reforms, one leading Italian trade 
union has argued that “one should not forget that raising the retirement age implies, 
not only that workers will be forced to work longer, but that two million jobs for the 
young will be lost”.
4 Furthermore the left-wing party “Rifondazione Comunista” 
claims that “the intergenerational exchange can be interpreted as the 50-years-old 
generation leaving their good jobs for the young. Would that be so dramatic for the 
social security administration? We do not think so”.
5 
                                                 
3 See OECD  (1999) for a survey on the main empirical evidences about the effects of the 
Employment Protection Legislation on aggregate labour market. 
4 Circolare Cobas October 2003 
5 From the website of “Rifondazione Comunista”   6
 
Although Boldrin et al. (1999) clearly argue that the “lump of labor” story is not 
operating in Europe, one could get the impression that a “young-in-old-out” policy 
was pursued in Italy in the years between 1985 and 1990 as a result of the incentives 
for firms to hire younger workers (Contini, Rapiti, 1999) and the incentives for 
workers to retire at very young ages (before age 55) due to the lack of any actuarial 
penalty on pension benefits. The overall effect on total labor force participation was 
basically close to zero, as the inflow of new workers balanced out with the outflow 
into retirement. However this substitutability between workers of different age groups 
seems just temporary, and in any case not necessarily “endogenous” but driven by 
separate determinants and, partly, by the business cycle. Indeed, the explanations for 
the changes in labor force participation, and particularly its composition, are less 
straightforward after the year 1990.    
 
One interpretation starts from the observation that two contrasting trends have taken 
place: after a period of "jobless growth" during  the 1980s and mid 1990s a total 
reversal occurred such that  labor markets appeared fairly lively in contrast with a 
stagnant economy and an output growth close to zero.  
Some authors (Boeri and Garibaldi 2007) have referred to a “honeymoon effect” of 
labor market policies creating such discrepancies in observed patterns of employment 
and unemployment data on the one hand  and output data on the other hand, taking 
effect well after the onset of the labor market  reforms.  
 
The claim of Boeri and Garibaldi is that there is a link between growth-less job 
creation and the asymmetric labor market reforms in EPL carried out in several 
European countries in the 1990s. In fact, such reforms introduced in Italy a two tier 
system, as the labor market became more flexible mainly through a series of marginal 
reforms that liberalized the use of temporary (fixed term) contracts, while leaving 
unchanged the legislation applying to the stock of workers employed under 
permanent (open-end) contracts. These authors emphasize that the changes of EPL 
and their impact on labor demand  do not produce any sizeable permanent 
employment effect
6.  The mechanism is that the reduction in EPL is bound to increase 
employment variability over the business cycle, while not having any permanent 
effect on average labour demand. This is because EPL affects both the incentives to 
hire and to dismiss workers, and there is no reason to expect a priori that one effect 
could dominate the other.  
 
Finally some attention has to be devoted to reforms to the educational system which 
have fostered the growth in school attendance - particularly at the University level. In 
1969 a reform was passed that allowed access to the University from any secondary 
school, while previously only students coming from a “lyceum” could access.  In the 
Appendix, we present evidence
7 for two groups of people: the “treatment group” are 
people who could benefit from the reform as they were around age 12 at the time of 
the reform (young cohorts), while the “control group” are people who could not 
benefit as they were much older. In Figures A1 to A3 we look at the status of these 
                                                 
6 See also Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; Bertola,1990 
7 The data set used is the Survey of Income and Wealth pof the Bank of Italy for several years.   7
people well after the University age. In particular we are interested in the difference 
in the prevalence of people by educational attainments. It is clear that the educational 
reform of 1969 has encouraged people to obtain a secondary school “diploma” and 
also a University degree (laurea). This is particularly evident for women.  
 
 
3. Institutional Background:   Main Features of the Social 
Security System 
 
The Italian social security system is based on a variety of institutions administering 
public pension programs for different types of workers (private-sector employees, 
public-sector employees, self-employed, professional workers)
8.  All programs are of 
the unfunded pay-as-you go (PAYG) type.  Despite a process towards convergence 
during the 1990s, the various programs maintain quite different rules. 
 
Currently, about two thirds of the labor force is insured with the National Social 
Security Institute (INPS).  The Institute is responsible for a number of separate funds, 
of which the most important covers the private-sector non-agricultural employees 
(Fondo Pensioni Lavoratori Dipendenti or FPLD). Because the basic aspects of the 
system are well documented elsewhere (see Brugiavini, 1999; Franco, 2002 and 
Brugiavini and Peracchi, 2004), we describe very briefly its main rules (eligibility, 
pensionable earnings, benefit computation, indexation and taxation of benefits). 
 
Starting in 1992, a sequence of legislated changes thoroughly modified the Social 
Security system originally designed in 1969.  The main reforms took place in 1992, 
1995 and 1997.  They are known, respectively, as the Amato, Dini and Prodi reforms, 
from the names of the Prime Ministers at the time.  In addition, smaller changes to the 
system have been made nearly every year since 1992.  Further changes are expected 
to take place in the near future. Of the three main reforms of the 1990s, the Dini 
reform appears as the most radical, because it completely redesigns the system by 
modifying the eligibility rules and by changing the benefit formula back from 
defined-benefits to defined-contributions, which was the type of formula in place 
prior to 1969.  However, because it will only be introduced gradually, through a very 
long transitional period, the direct effects of the Dini reform may be considered small 
compared to the less radical Amato reform.  
Overall, because of the long transitional periods, the cohorts that reached the 
retirement age during the 1990s and those currently retiring remained largely 
unaffected by the reforms of the 1990s, as most of the burden of the adjustment fell 
on the younger cohorts (Franco, 2002; Brugiavini and Galasso, 2003).  More 
precisely, the 1992 (Amato) reform explicitly distinguishes between workers with at 
least 15 years of contributions at the end of 1992 and all other workers.  The old 
system (introduced in 1969) applies, with some changes, to the former, whereas the 
                                                 
8 Social security system and pension system are in this paper used as synonymous. In fact, in Italy 
the social security  is the main source of publicly provided income in old age. Contributions are 
compulsory for employers and employees and benefits are earnings related. There is only a minor 
flat component granted to very old people (over 65) under means testing, if the beneficiary has no 
other incomes.   8
new system only applies to the latter.  The adoption of different rules for older and 
younger workers is maintained in the subsequent 1995 (Dini) and 1997 (Prodi) 
reforms.  In particular, with the exception of the new eligibility rules, very few 
changes apply to workers with 18 or more years of contributions at the end of 1995, 
beyond those already introduced in 1992. 
 
The following list of legislative changes highlights exogenous variations in benefits 
envisaged by the reforms that are potentially relevant to our study and, in an ideal 
data set, could be identified. We limit ourselves to the years 1976 to 2004, 
corresponding to the sample period and focus particularly on changes which affect the 
decision to retire, hence particularly changes to eligibility rules. 
 
 
•  In 1992 (Amato Reform) the age requirement for an old-age pension is 
gradually increased by one year of age every two years, starting from 1994, until 
reaching age 65 for men and age 60 for women in 2002. 
The new requirements for an old-age pension (age 65 for men and age 60 for women) 
apply starting from 1994 to managers and self-employed workers.  Also from 1994, 
the requirement is set at age 65 for state employees (irrespective of gender) and age 
60 for local government employees (again, irrespective of gender). The old 
requirements remain unchanged for a few special categories (army and police 
personnel, flight personnel, travelling personnel of public transportation services, 
firemen and employees of the entertainment industry).  
The numbers of years of contribution required for an old-age pension is gradually 
increased by one every two years starting from 1993, until reaching 20 years of 
contributions in 2000.  
For workers with less than 15 years of contributions at the end of 1992, the reference 
period for computing pensionable earnings is gradually increased until including the 
whole working life, with past wages adjusted to inflation on the basis of the annual 
rate of change of the cost-of-living index increased by 1%. 
New rules for combining pensions and earned income apply to pension granted after 
1992: seniority pensions now cannot be combined with earned income, whereas 
disability and old-age pensions can be combined, but only partially. The possibility of 
combining seniority pensions with income from self-employment was subsequently 
reintroduced in 1993.  
Pensions are automatically adjusted, on an annual basis, only to the changes in the 
cost of living.  
•  In 1995 (Dini Reform)  the payroll tax rate increases from 27% to 32%. 
Gradual introduction of an age limit for seniority pensions, equal to age 57 for both 
men and women in year 2008. 
A new defined contribution (DC) system based on notional accumulated contributions 
applies to workers who start their career after 1995. 
A “pro-quota” system applies to workers with less than 18 years of contributions at 
the end of 1995. 
•  After 1995, the main changes are an acceleration in the introduction of an age 
limit for seniority pensions and a further harmonization of the pension rules for 
public-sector and private-sector employees.    9
 
4. Institutional Background: Labor Market Legislation and 
Reforms 
 
The rigidity of labor market rules in Italy goes back to 1966 when legislation on 
unfair dismissals established that employers had either to re-employ the worker or 
pay him a generous severance lump sum. The payment was higher for firms with 
more than 60 employees. An important change took place in 1970 (Statuto dei 
Lavoratori) establishing that firms with 15 employees or more had to hire back 
workers undergoing unfair dismissal and also pay them the foregone wages, while 
firms below 15 employees were total exempted from this rule. 
 
The important changes to the labor market legislation between 1970 and 2004  can be 
allocated into four  main periods (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007): pre 1985, between 
1985 and 1997, between 1997 and 2003 and post 2003. 
 
As for the first period an important change occurred in 1985, when special hiring 
conditions were granted to firms for contracts which envisaged on-the-job training 
(contratti formazione lavoro). These were clearly aimed at reducing youth-
unemployment and indeed hiring of younger workers (age 25 or less) became sizeable 
particularly in the industrial sector. 
The second period goes from 1985 to 1997. This is characterized by a  wider use of 
fixed term contracts (if allowed by industry-level collective agreements) and a 
reorganization of public employment agencies (Law 28/2/1987 nr.56) which should 
in principle guarantee a more efficient matching process.  
 
The first important landmark is the 1997 reform known as the "Treu Package". 
This includes a reduction of the penalties occurring in case of violation of the fixed 
term contracts’ discipline (conversion of fixed-term contract into an open-ended one). 
It allows for temporary work agencies to operate in the labor market. Non-permanent 
labour contracts are encouraged by reducing social security contributions and pension 
provisions into open-ended ones. The package also  makes it easier to make use of 
apprenticeship and work-training contracts and sets further incentives for on-the-job 
training.   
 
A fourth period starts with the "Biagi Law" of 2003.  New types of labour contracts 
come into life:  job-on-call, job sharing, supplementary work, "lavoro a progetto", 
which slightly tightened the regime for the already existing short term contracts 
(known as  "Co.co.co"). 
 
Overall the Treu Package and the Biagi Law regulated in a less restrictive way the 
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5.  Descriptive evidence on the Italian Labor Market 
 
This section briefly describes the data sources used in the paper and the way we 
constructed the key variables for the analysis. It then shows descriptive evidence on 
the Italian labor market. 
 
Our main data sources are the Labor Force Survey (Indagine sulle Forze di Lavoro) 
or FLS, conducted by the Italian national statistical institute (ISTAT) and the Survey 
of Household Income and Wealth (I Bilanci delle Famiglie Italiane) or SHIW, 
conducted on behalf of the Bank of Italy. 
 
The FLS  data set 
The Labor Force Survey is a quarterly sample longitudinal survey first conducted in 
1959. It was carried out every second working week of each quarter (i.e. January, 
April, July and October) until 2004. From 2005 it is carried out continuously during 
the year. The Labor Force Survey covers 300 thousands households, 800,000 
individuals distributed in 1351 Italian municipalities. In this paper we use the 
quarterly Labor Force Survey data from 1977 to 2004. 
The statistical units are de facto households  and the questionnaire is administered  to 
all household members with more than 15 years of age. The classification of the 
individuals in the different professional classes is based on the self reported status of 
the individuals and on a series of  answers regarding the job activity of the respondent  
during the week before the interview. Moreover, the classification of the respondent 
is constructed following a hierarchical process: first, the employed are identified; 
secondly, among all the non employed the job seekers-unemployed  (both previously 
employed and first time seekers) are identified; finally, all the remaining individuals 
are classified as out of the labor force. 
All the definition and classification used in the Labor Force Survey are based on the 
principles stated by the International Labour Office in 1982 and they are the result of 
an harmonization process that make them comparable with the ones adopted by all 
the European countries.  In particular, the definition of unemployed has been changed 
during the years. First, in 1984, the definition of job seeker was changed to capture 
the criterion of self-reported “willingness to work”. In 1986, the definition of job 
seekers was restricted to those individuals who self-report to have actively searched 
for work. Finally, in 1992 the job search period of the unemployed was limited to 30 
days before the interview date. 
 
Trends in the labor force  
 
By making use of the different waves of the  LFS we can show trends of the activity 
rates and employment-unemployment  rates for the different age groups in the 
population. In particular these groups are 
•  Young: people in age 20-24 
•  Prime age: people in age 25-54 
•  Old age: people in age 55-64   11
However, we can look at finer aggregations of age groups which are relevant for the 
labor market (e.g. distinguish the group aged 15-19 from the group aged 20-24).  One 
advantage of our data sets is that we can also exploit, both for the LFS and the SHIW 
sample, the important regional variation of the Italian labor market, in particular we 
distinguish 5 geographical areas: North-West, North-East, Center, South-West and 
South-East. 
The most intuitive description of the labor force trends by age-groups is provided by 
time series presented in levels. One point to be stressed is that the LF series have a 
break due to the recording methods in 1993: the Italian Statistical Office has revised 
the series before 1993 so that the break is no longer visible in the unemployment rate 
and the activity rates
9. 
  
Figure 5.1 shows the labor force participation  rate for young workers and older 
workers and the unemployment rate for the young, for the period 1977-2004. The 
vertical bars refer to the years of the social security reforms. The unemployment rate 
is defined according to the standard labor market definition, as the ratio of 
unemployed people on active people, i.e. the unemployed over the LF. Hence this rate 
is more sensitive to business cycle fluctuations than employment rates, particularly 
for the youth-unemployment rate.  
 
The descriptive evidence suggests that there is no simple relationship between the 
labor force participation of the old and the unemployment rate of the young. In the 
1970’s and 1980’s the labor force participation of the old had a steady decline while 
the unemployment rate of the young increased. It is only in recent years that the effect 
of the social security reforms are felt: a reversal in the declining trend is observed in 
the labor force participation for the age group 55-64, i.e. workers for which the age-
limits to access early retirement have gradually become binding, around the year 
2000
10. 
Overall these trends suggest that the reforms had- independently for the social 
security system and the labor market - some impact:  the youth unemployment rates 
decrease after 1997 and social security reforms increased labor force participation 












                                                 
9 We are grateful to the Italian Statistical Office ISTAT for letting us have access to the MARRS 
data base 
10 Appendix: he same rates are presented in index form, where  1977 is the base-year (set at 100).    12
Figure 5.1 Italy: Trends on labor force participation of the young and old 















1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year




Figure 5.1A Italy: Trends on labor force participation of the young and old 
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Figure 5.1B Italy: Trends on labor force participation of the young and old 
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There is no evidence of substitutability between older workers and younger workers: 
the two time series seem to be positively correlated, when the unemployment rate of 
the young increases there are also more older workers leaving the labor market. The 
fact that these times series vary in a pro-cyclical fashion is also confirmed by the time 
series of youth labor force participation. 
However the aggregate figures conceal important gender differences. Figures 5.1A 
and 5.1B report the same times series distinguishing between male workers (5.1A) 
and female workers (5.1B). The unemployment rate of the young shows the same 
trend and cycles for males and females, the level of the unemployment rate for 
females is higher in each year. The labor force participation of older workers shows 
marked gender differences: male workers in the age group 55-64 exit the labor force 
at an increasing rate over time, apart from the reversal in the trend after the year 2000, 
for female workers of the same age group the time series is flat or even increasing, 
due to relevant cohort effects.     
 
Figure 5.2 shows the same patterns but the emphasis is on the trend in the 
unemployment rate of prime age workers (age 25-54). For this group the 
unemployment rate is at a much lower level, hence confirming that youth 
unemployment is the main determinant of total unemployment. 
 
Figure 5.3 stresses once more that the labor force participation of the youngest group 
and of the oldest group are pro-cyclical. The decline in labor force participation of the 
young occurring in the late 1980’s early 1990’s is largely due to an increasing 
participation to schooling and to the rigidity of the labour market in those years. Only 
in the recent years the labor force participation rate of the elderly is reversing the 
trend (due to the pension reforms). For these trends too there is a clear gender   14
difference: due to cohort effects there is a growth in older female workers after the 
year 1997. For younger females the pattern is similar to that observed for younger 
males as schooling also plays an important role in this case.  
 
 
Figure 5.2 Italy: Trends in the labor force participation rate of the old and 
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Figure 5.2A Italy: Trends in the labor force participation rate of the old and 
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Figure 5.2B Italy: Trends in the labor force participation rate of the old and 
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Figure 5.3 Italy: Trends in the labor force participation rate of the old,  of the 
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Figure 5.3A Italy: Trends in the labor force participation rate of the old,  of the 
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Figure 5.3B Italy: Trends in the labor force participation rate of the old,  of the 
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As for the exits from the labor force Italy has two main routes: old age and early 
retirement. Invalidity pensions were relevant until the beginning of the 1980’s, but 
regulation on access to invalidity benefits became much stricter in those years and the 
inflow of such benefits was driven down to very small numbers within a ten years 
period. 
Figure 5.4  shows the stock of outstanding benefits, by type of benefit and by year
11. 
Unfortunately we cannot distinguish the early retirement route, it is clear that 
                                                 
11 ISTAT, Casellario delle Pensioni   17
invalidity benefits gradually become negligible as invalidity beneficiaries become old 
age beneficiaries at age 65, if still receiving the benefit. The other explanation is that 
the cause of disability is no longer applicable or that the beneficiary dies. 
 
Figures 5.5A and 5.5B provide the stock of early retirement/ old age benefits: from 
the year 2000 we can distinguish by age class. Under the assumption that in the age 
brackets 50-54 and 55-59 we find early retirement benefit and that in some cases 
these are also claimed between the ages 60 and 64, one can draw the conclusion that 
the restrictions on eligibility rules have indeed been biting in recent years. 
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Figure 5.5B Number of recipients of early retirement/old age social security 
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6.  Incentives to retire 
 
In order to capture the effects of changes in legislation, particularly the ones due to 
pension reforms, we contrast several measures of the incentives with the labor force 
time series. 
We will develop a simulation method to construct our incentives measures: this way 
we will embed, in each year,  legislation changes in the social security system (i.e. 
benefit calculation and eligibility rules) at the same time avoiding the endogeneity 
problems contaminating actual social security data series. 
In order to carry out this simulation (based on Brugiavini and Peracchi 2005) we 
make use of Survey (Survey of Household Income and Wealth)  containing detailed 
information on several characteristics of individuals in Italy.   
 
 
The SHIW data set  
The variables concerning social security benefits analyzed in this paper are based on 
information drawn from the SHIW sample. The SHIW  is a repeated cross-sectional 
survey first conducted in 1965.  It was carried out annually until 1987 (except for 
1985), every two years until 1995, and then again in 1998, 2000 and 2002.  The most 
recent survey, conducted with reference to the year 2002, covers about 8,000 
households and 21,000 people. From 1989, the survey contains a panel component.  
Currently, about half of the sample (4,000 households in all) is included in the panel. 
In this paper we use the historical data base (Bank of Italy 2004), which contains the 
harmonized micro-level data for the period 1977-2002. 
The survey units are de facto households.  All household members (including those 
aged less than 15) are asked to indicate their income in the year before the survey.  
Questions about the household are submitted to the head of the household (see also   19
Appendix 1 for details). Because of the over-sampling of certain population strata in 
some years (especially in 1987), and differential non-response and attrition rates, it is 
crucial to use the survey weights when estimating features of the population, such as 
means, variances and percentiles.  
The quantity and quality of the information collected by the survey increased through 
time. For example, until 1983 age was only recorded in broadly defined brackets. 
From 1984, age is recorded in years and so one can study the behavior of birth 
cohorts defined by single years of age. Until 1989, little information was available for 
those who do not receive any income. Basically, only gender, age, relationship to the 
head and main activity (housewife, student, etc.) were recorded, but 
there was no information on, for example, educational attainments and marital status. 
The frequent changes in the definitions complicate the task of constructing time 
consistent measures. This is particularly true for variables such as the schooling level, 
the sector of employment and 
the type of job. However the “historical archive” of the Bank of Italy provides 





Before turning to the simulation methodology we look at a simple measure capturing 
changes in eligibility rules: this is the sum of minimum age requirements and number 
of years of seniority necessary to apply for an early retirement benefit. In fact workers 
could retire in Italy either with a sufficiently high age (the legal retirement age for old 
age benefits which is now 65 for men) or with a given number of years of 
contributions (for example any age if 40 years of contributions have been completed) 
or a combination of the two (for example 57 years of age and 35 years of 
contributions). We call this variable “quota”: before 1995 this was equal to 60 
because one could retire with 20 years of contributions at “any age”, for example age 
40, it then grew suddenly in 1995 to reach level 83 and increased gradually thereafter.  
 
Figure 6.1 shows the relationship between unemployment rate of the young and the 
“quota” variable: they both jump around the years 1993-1996, however while the 
quota “index” keeps growing until the most recent years the unemployment rate of 
the young shows a relevant swing. The most interesting picture in this respect is   
Figure 6.2, showing the relationship between the employment rate of the old and the 
variable quota. The trend in the “quota” indicator anticipates of a few years the rise in 
employment of the old group.  
However the “quota” variable is a rather rough measure of the complex financial 
incentives of the social security system: we construct incentives which capture 
different dynamic features of the social security system.  
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Social Security Wealth and Incentives 
 
In the SHIW sample we have variation with respect to all individual characteristics 
and we can also distinguish whether the pension benefit originates from a private 
sector occupation, public sector occupation or from self-employment (in this paper 
we refer to these as “employment types” or simply “jobs”). 
To compute the simulated benefits, we start from the profile of median earnings of a 
given cohort, as in Brugiavini and Peracchi (2004), we focus on cohorts born before 
the Second World War, in particular individuals born in 1938 and 1939 and carry out 
the estimate separately for men and 
women and by employment type (private-employee, public-employee and self-
employed). We smooth the earnings profiles by means of age polynomials and also 
by non parametric smoothers. The same real earnings profile is then imputed (taking 
account of the relevant job-gender group) to members of that group. Productivity 
growth of the different cohorts is attributed by shifting the age profile
12. 
 
Simulated benefits are then obtained according to the prevailing legislation for each 
employment type, taking account also of eligibility rules. For example,  we model the 
Reform of 1992 (implemented in 1993) known as the "Amato" reform: changes 
affected both currently retired people (trough a reduced indexation- based on inflation 
only) and future retirees through a changes in the benefit calculation, eligibility rules 
and indexation of future benefits  (see Brugiavini and Peracchi,  2004 for details). 
Hence effects on current variables, such as disposable social security benefits, are 
immediately captured after 1992, both because of the effects on pensioners and 
because of the changes (gradually less and less generous)  to newly awarded benefits 
during the transitional period.  It should be noted that there are differences both in the 
way rules changed for different types of employment  and in the way these changes 
impacted on individuals' behaviour (e.g. consumption) because these groups of the 
population started from different conditions (public sector employees had more 
generous pensions to start with).  All monetary amounts are measured in Euros at 
constant 2005 prices.  
 
Although in Italy  there have been a number of changes to the benefit computation 
rules, eligibility rules have been almost unchanged in the relevant years  until the 
1992 reform. Also the existence of a generous  early retirement option has allowed 
retirees to have plenty of flexibility on the timing of retirement, so that the 
introductions of more restrictive eligibility rules of the 1990’s had little impact in the 
current cohorts of retirees. The effects of the minimum requirements are felt more 
recently especially for the younger old.    
 
Figure 6.3 provides a graphical representation of social security wealth by year and 
cohort for hypothetical “median wage earners” of that cohort. The cohort- times 
series are obtained as weighted averages of the social security wealth of men and 
women and of the different employment types.  
                                                 
12 Growth rates in earnings for the different cohorts are computed on the basis of two sources: 
Rossi-Sorgato-Toniolo 1993 for the data before 1990 and the SHIW data set for the more recent 
years.   22
For each cohort the patter is generally hump-shaped, i.e. there is a peak value reached 
at some eligible age and W declines thereafter. Besides a secular increasing trend in 
the level of W one can observe also a larger dispersion: after the reforms of the 
1990’s,  the W starts at a lower level and it reaches a peak value at a much older age. 
Part of this variability across cohorts is also due to changes in productivity and 
changes in mortality
13. It is clear that changes in eligibility conditions, particularly the 
minimum age requirement for access to early retirement plays an important role in 
shaping the SSW profile. Changes in the benefit computation rules occurring after 
1992 explain why retirees who claim early retirement would have low benefits due to 
lower average “pensionable earnings”, despite the fact that there is no actuarial 
penalty on early retirement in Italy. 
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When aggregating the age-year values of social security wealth one obtains an yearly 
index of the incentives faced by different cohorts in that particular year. We make use 
of two incentive measures, both are weighted averages: the first one called W  is the 
weighted sum of W, the second is called I  and it combines both the level of social 
security wealth and the peak value. W  is a synthetic incentive measure which reflects 
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This is an average of W(a,y), the social security benefit, between the year cohort a 
enter eligibility until year y. Weights are based on the labor force participation rate by 
                                                 
13 We experimented by fixing both the productivity and the mortality probabilities so that the only 
variability is in the age-earnings profile and in legislation. Important variability across cohorts is 
still observed due to the reforms.   23
year and cohort (data source: ISTAT). With this formula we are implicitly assuming 
that, before age 50, i.e. before eligibility, cohort a social security benefit is zero. The 
rationale is that W(a,y) accounts for the forgone benefit by a member of cohort a if 
she decides not to retire in year y. Hence, if cohort a is not eligible in year y, 
individuals of that cohort have no choice whether to retire or not, and therefore have 
no forgone benefits. 
The further step now is to build an aggregate measure of expected social security 
benefits across cohorts for a given year: we average  y) (a, W  over cohorts’ population 


















































































t y t a LFP
t y t a LFP


















y) P(a,  is the proportion of retired person in the given year and it is estimated in the 
SHIW Survey, LFP is the labor force participation in a given year and age, this is 
taken from the Labor Force Survey .  
Note that for Italy we regard age 50 as the first eligibility age. Also we have available 
gender variation and regional variation, hence this measure has been computed 
conditional on gender, and macro region, then aggregated at the “national-pooled” 
level. 
 
A second index is based on the peak value  y)   (a, PV
* : this may vary with y and it may 
also vary with age in a given year because of different earnings histories for different 
cohorts. The peak value is defined as the maximum present value of W(a,y) for ages 
greater than a. The measure I(a,y)  takes into account both social security benefits an 
the peak value using a discount factor J and weights q, which represent the 
proportion of individuals in the labor force at a given age and year (LFP): 
 
[3]  [ ] { } ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , (
* y a q y a PV y a W y a W y a I − + = α  
 
y)   (a, PV
* , consistently with the underlying measure W(a,y), is set to zero if the 
current age is below the eligibility age. The value of  J will be chosen optimally as 
discussed below. 
By averaging over the different cohorts I(a,y) becomes an annual time series (as we 
did with W(a,y)), hence   ) (y I  is defined as: 
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The intuition of the index I is to combine both the wealth effect generated by the 
social security wealth variabòle and the dynamic gains from waiting to retire. It 
explicitly models the trade off that a higher social security wealth W may induce the 
worker to retire early, however this has to be set against the gains from postponing 
retirement (W-PV) which represent the advantage of staying at work. The latter is 
discounted by the appropriate discount factor which depends on the impatience of the 
individual, if  J =0 we have an extreme case where individuals are so impatient that 
they not take into account future gains or losses.   
 
In order to obtain endogenously the optimal discount factor we make use of two 
methodologies: the first one is the iteration procedure and the second the regression 
approach. Both build on a simple relationship of the type: 
 
[5]  t t t t t t old X PV W W LFP ε β θ γ + + − + = ) ( ,  
 
Where W and (W-PV) are the two terms in the index I and X is a matrix of controls. 
When the iteration procedure is implemented we perform a simplified maximum 
likelihood approach by setting L=1 and letting S vary in a given grid, in order to 
maximize the resulting R-squared. The value of   S which gives the highest R-squared 
is chosen as the optimal J. In the regression approach we let both parameters  L and S 
vary freely and compute  J as the ratio between the two. 
  
Both indexes W and I are computed on the basis of data relating to the median worker 
derived from the SHIW Survey.  
 
Table 1 reports the estimates of these parameters through the two methodologies. We 
also distinguish a case where workers are “constrained”, i.e. they cannot access their 
benefits before the eligibility age and therefore both W and (W-PV) are set to zero. 
As it emerges from Table 1 our preferred specification (delivering the highest R-
squared) in the iteration method is with α=1.50 both in the unconstrained and the 
constrained case
14.  As for the latter we obtain opposite signs, which is 
counterintuitive, but these estimates are hardly significant. Hence in the remainder of 
the paper we focus on estimates of the effect of incentives on labor force participation  
obtained  with α equal to 1.50 
  
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 show the times series of the incentive indexes obtained. The I-
index is more hump-shaped as it reflects the dynamic in the peak value which 
emerges from Figure 6.3. It is interesting to note that when liquidity constraints are 
                                                 
14 It should be noted that in this paper α is exactly the discount factor presented in equation  [3]   25
introduced the I-index is rather sensitive to this change as for Italian workers such 
constraints are binding by effectively reducing the access to early retirement benefits.  
 
Figure A4 in the Appendix shows the effect of the different parameter configuration 
on the index I, the higher α, the more pronounced is the hump. The index W is 
dominated by the growth of generosity of the system in the early years and by the fact 
that older cohorts started collecting benefits having completed full careers in the years 
1970s. The Index-W peters out at the end of the 1990’s both as an effect of reduced 
generosity and as a result of the demographic changes. 
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Figure 6.6. Italy Unemployment rate of the young and of the prime age group 
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Figure 6.7. Italy Unemployment rate of the young and of the prime age group 
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Figures 6.6 and 6.7  show the relationship between the Index “W” of equation [2], 
the index I  and the unemployment rate of the young and of the prime age group. 
Although there seem to be some correlation between the secular trends in the time   27
series, this correlation fails after the reforms when the unemployment rates fluctuate 
while the indexes decline steadily.   
 
A similar picture emerges from Figures 6.8 and 6.9 which relate the incentive 
measures to the employment rates of the young and of the prime age group. 
 
 
Figure 6.8. Italy: Employment rate of the young and of the prime age group and 







































1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year




Figure 6.9. Italy: Employment rate of the young and of the prime age group and 
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7. Regression Analysis 
 
The descriptive evidence has shown some possible correlations between the 
unemployment rate of the young and the labor force participation of the old, however 
we argued that this correlation is mainly due to the underlying business cycle. 
Incentive variables, which represent our “instrumental variables” in capturing the 
possible nexus between pension policies and labor market trends,  also seem to play a 
role in explaining the behaviour of the older workers (but presumably not of the 
young people). 
These questions can be better addressed in a more structured fashion by resorting to 
the regression analysis.    
In a first set of regressions (referred to as “OLS regressions”) we investigate a simple 
relationship between the labor market trends for the young (prime age) and that of the 
old. The relationship is of the type 
 
[7]  t t t t X V Y ε β θ γ + + + =  
 
Where Yt represents either the unemployment rate or the employment rate of the 
young and  Vt represents either the labour force participation or the employment rate 
of the older workers. In a different specification we also model the percentage of 
young individuals in education.  
In a first set of regressions we use the pooled time series (no gender variation). 
The covariates are: GDP, a dummy for the change in compulsory education age, the 
median wage, the contractual wage (variation only over time), the percentage of 
people in school. Apart from GDP, which is derived from the ISTAT-Yearly 
Statistical Bulletin, all the other series are derived from the SHIW data. 
 
Results are shown in Table 2A , 2B and 2C, Table A2 in the Appendix also shows 
the results with the full list of covariates. We consider both a specification with the 
pooled data (Table 2A) and one where we allow for gender variation and make use of 
a “male” dummy. This variation is quite relevant in Italy as the graphs on 
unemployment rates and labour force participation show.  There are four 
specifications for each regression: one is in levels and the others experiment with 
different lag structures. We also distinguish a case with no other covariates besides 
the labour force participation, one with a full set of covariates (including the median 
wage, contractual wage, GDP per capita etc…) and one specification where we select 
a subset of covariates (GDP per capita, GDP growth and the share of GDP produced 
by the industrial sector)
15.   
 
In all cases where we relate the unemployment rate (or employment rate) of the 
young to the labor force participation of the older workers we confirm the descriptive 
evidence that they tend to move in a  pro-cyclical fashion, i.e. when the labor force 
participation of the old goes up the employment rate of the young also increases 
(unemployment decreases), these estimates are also significant and robust the 
                                                 
15 It should be  noted that in Italy there is no such thing as “minimum wage” going back for the 
entire time period. This is mainly because contracts envisage only at time a minimum wage, they 
usually define a contractual wage.   29
inclusion of covariates. As for the young people in schooling we get mixed evidence: 
for the level specification an increase in labor force participation of the old is 
negatively related to the trend in schooling attendance, however this result is usually 
reversed in the regression with five years differences, suggesting that there might be a 
long wave in this relationship. Our intuition is that this result is dominated by the 
basic increasing trend in schooling which is not sensitive to business cycle variations. 
Interestingly enough when we consider the employment (unemployment) of prime 
age workers we get mostly a pro-cyclical pattern: employment of the prime wage 
workers and labor force participation of the old grow together.  We run a simple 
“causality” test by looking at the impulse response functions of the unemployment 
rate of the young and the activity rate of the old in response to a one-time change in 
GDP per capita. Results are shown in the Appendix (Figures A5 and A6): the 
unemployment rate of the young is much more reactive to GDP changes and is less 
precisely estimated, however one can see that both series respond to GDP in a pro-
cyclical fashion. In particular the unemployment rate of the young anticipates the 
response to GDP with respect to the activity rate of the old, so that one might be 
induced to infer e reverse causality from the youth-UR to the old-AR. But the impulse 
response function clearly suggests that GDP is the main driver. These results are also 
robust to the introduction of gender variability (Table 2B) and of regional variability 
(Table 2C). Overall the time series of employment and unemployment of the young 
do not seem to be directly affected by the labor force participation in alleviating the 
unemployment problem,  the “young-in-old-out” paradigm is contradicted by the 
data. 
 
As we argued there are potential endogeneity problems in relating the unemployment 
rate of the young directly to the labor force participation of the old. In order to 
overcome these problems we test a set of specifications where the main explanatory 
variables are the incentive variables. Results are presented in Table 3.  
 
Table 3 contains different cases: 
(i) a first difference is drawn by choosing different levels of the J parameter. This can 
take value zero (effectively focusing on the incentive variable W only) or value 1.5, 
which is our preferred specification, or finally it can take the value emerging from the 
regression methodology (albeit of the wrong sign and not significant)  
   
(ii) a second difference is the inclusion of liquidity constraints in the estimation of the 
index I 
 
(iii) a third difference is with the use of covariates  
 
(iv) a fourth difference is with the lag/differencing structure, starting as usual from 
the specification in levels. 
 
Results are very robust to the different variants described above. By focusing the 
attention on the case where J =1.5 and there are no liquidity constraints, one can see 
that a larger inducement to retire has a positive and significant effect on the 
unemployment rate of the young (negative on the employment rate). Hence incentives 
directed to the elderly have no beneficial effect on the unemployment rate of the   30
younger generations. A similar lesson is drawn when the dependent variable is the 
schooling rate of the young. The only cases where some of the effect is lost is when 
we resort to five-years differences (which reduces the sample size). On the other 
hand, incentives to retire have a strong and positive effect on exits from the labor 
force of the elderly as the labor force participation of the older groups shows a 
negative and significant coefficient.  
Results are stable  also if we allow for the effects of liquidity constraints on the 
inducement to retire: this could be relevant in Italy as the restrictions imposed by the 







Italy is a country characterized by high rates of unemployment, particularly for the 
younger generations. The generosity of the pension system prior to the reforms of the 
1990’s has induced many workers to retire early and some policy makers, particularly 
unions, have supported the “Young-in-Old-out” paradigm. However we prove that for 
Italy the “lump of labor” assumption fails and we do this through two main routes.  
 
First we show that the direct relationship between the unemployment rate of the 
young (age 20-24) and the labor force participation of the old (55-64) is pro-cyclical, 
i.e. a higher labor force participation of the old is related to a lower unemployment 
rate of the young. Hence both vary with the business cycle. This results is very robust 
to the lag structure we impose, so it is not just an artefact of the timing in the business 
cycle. It is also robust to a variation that distinguishes groups by gender, given the 
important gender-differences in labor market behaviour. 
 
The second route recognizes that in the previous approach there might be an 
endogeneity problem, hence we resort to a simulated variable: “the inducement to 
retire”, which is constructed by simulating the social security benefits to the median 
worker taking into account the relevant social security legislation. There are two 
versions of this incentive variables, one is simply the average social security wealth 
and the other is an index which also includes the potential gains (losses) from 
postponing retirement, hence it is more dynamic.     
We have related the unemployment rate of the young to these incentive measures and 
found that a higher inducement to retire is associated to a higher unemployment rate – 
quite the opposite of the “young-in-old-out” story. The variables capturing the 
inducement  to retire have a  significant effect on  the labour force participation of 
older workers, this is of the expected sign (the higher the incentive the lower labor 
force) and very robust to the different specifications, hence suggesting that Italian 




   31
Table 1. Italy: Estimates of the parameters of the I-index 
 
  UNCONSTRAINED LIQUIDITY  CONSTRAINED 
                   
Iterating over alpha with gamma==1 with 0.25 intervals and regressing LFP of old on Ibar 
LFP  OLD GAMMA ALPHA  RATIO R
2 Ibar  weighting  GAMMA  ALPHA  RATIO  R
2 Ibar  weighting 
 1  1.50  1.50  0.8134  1*W+1.50*(W-PV)  1 1.50 1.50  0.8038  1*W+1.50*(W-PV) 
                   
Time series regression of LFP old on W and (W-PV) 
LFP  OLD GAMMA ALPHA  RATIO R
2 Ibar  weighting  GAMMA  ALPHA  RATIO  R
2 Ibar  weighting 
  0.2991315  -0.2480815 -0.83  0.8201 0.299*W-0.248*(W-PV)  0.7126528 -0.5474849  -0.77  0.7809  0.713*W-0.547*(W-PV) 
                   
 
Note: I is divided by 100000. 
 
Note: The estimates of ALPHA and GAMMA for the regression method, though being of different sign, are not significant. 
 
Note: Covariates have been used to estimate the best alpha; both in the regression method and in the iteration method. 
Covariates includes: Year, GDP per head, GDP per capita growth , median wage of the age group under study, percentage of people in 
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Table 2A.  
DIRECT EFFECT OF LFP OLD ON UNEMPLOYMENT OR EMPLOYMENT OF YOUNG AND PRIME AGE GROUPS. 
DIRECT EFFECT OF LFP OLD ON SCHOOLING PARTICIPATION OF THE YOUNGER AGE GROUP 
 
POOLED GENDERS – NATIONAL LEVEL DATA 
 
  Direct effect of elderly LFP rate on young and prime age 
  Youth (20-24)  Prime Age (25-54) 
 UR  ER  School  UR  ER 
  Pooled  Pooled 
NO COVARIATES  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels (28 obs.)  -1.624 0.157 1.955  0.204  -1.259  0.264  -0.823  0.047  -0.380  0.125 
                    
3 year lag on elderly LFP (25 
obs.) 
-0.712 0.247 1.709  0.234  -1.010  0.164  -0.608  0.087  -0.464  0.090 
                    
5 year difference (23 obs.)  -2.177 0.377 1.104  0.415 0.657  0.334  -0.684  0.105  0.593 0.176 
                    
5 year log difference (23 obs.)  -2.564 0.502 0.848  0.322 0.551  0.387  -3.443  0.476  0.285 0.082 
                    
ALL COVARIATES   Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels (27 obs.)  -2.706 0.458 0.477  0.363 1.176  0.619  -0.619  0.072  0.559 0.115 
                    
3 year lag on elderly LFP (25 
obs.) 
0.355 0.974  -0.633 0.827  -0.388  0.627  0.407  0.371  -0.355  0.354 
                    
5 year difference (23 obs.)  -2.794 0.308 0.935  0.260 0.837  0.496  -0.527  0.066  0.451 0.109 
                    
5 year log difference (23 obs.)  -4.993 0.695 1.488  0.349 1.589  0.317  -3.380  0.321  0.337 0.022 
ALL COVARIATES without  
school leaving age dummy and 
contractual wage 
Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels (27 obs.)  -2.758 0.201 1.071  0.177 0.501  0.309  -0.653  0.056  0.597 0.108 
                    
3 year lag on elderly LFP (25 
obs.) 
0.144 1.404 0.028 0.989  0.671  0.656  0.233  0.360  -0.105  0.318 
                    
5 year difference (23 obs.)  -2.769 0.179 0.997  0.150 0.389  0.312  -0.613  0.040  0.527 0.077 
                    
5 year log difference (23 obs.)  -4.583 0.641 1.165  0.346 1.483  0.339  -2.736  1.057  0.343 0.084   33
 
SELECTED COVARIATES  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels (27 obs.)  -2.250 0.333 1.058  0.410 0.540  0.319  -0.662  0.096  0.585 0.119 
                    
3 year lag on elderly LFP (25 
obs.) 
0.947 1.460  -2.842 1.216  1.897  0.561  0.641  0.472  -0.623  0.488 
                    
5 year difference (23 obs.)  -2.276 0.277 1.099  0.182 0.388  0.285  -0.628  0.044  0.525 0.073 
                    
5 year log difference (23 obs.)  -2.893 0.544 1.013  0.175 0.254  0.415  -3.515  0.517  0.297 0.041 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Unemployment and employment of young and prime age,  
Percentage of people in school of young people  
 
ALL COVARIATES:  
- Year (not in the 5 years difference case),  
- GDP per capita/1000,  
- GDP growth (not in the difference case), 
- percentage of people in school,  
- share of industry in the GDP,  
- median wage/1000,  
- contractual wage/1000,  
- dummy for changes in the compulsory school leaving age (dropped in the 5 years log difference case). 
 
SELECTED COVARIATES:  
- GDP per capita/1000,  
- GDP growth (not in the difference case),  
- share of industry in the GDP 
 
SPECIFICATION OF REGRESSIONS: 
Levels: Y= employment of old + year + gdp per capita + ... 
3 yea lag on elderly employment:  Y= employment of old [n-3] + year + gdp per capita + ... 
5 year difference: Y-Y[n-5]= (employment of old -employment of old [n-5]) +  (gdp per capita-gdp per capita [n-5]) + ... 
5 year log difference: Y-Y[n-5]= [log (employment of old )-log(employment of old [n-5])] +  [log(gdp per capita)-log(gdp per capita [n-
5])] + ...  34
 Table 2B. DIRECT EFFECT OF LFP OF THE OLD 
 
GENDER VARIABILITY – NATIONAL LEVEL DATA 
 
  Direct effect of elderly LFP on young and prime age 
  Youth (20-24)  Prime Age (25-54) 
 UR  ER  School  UR  ER 
     
NO COVARIATES  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels (56 obs.)  -0.251 0.030 0.447  0.034  -0.101  0.038  -0.159  0.014  1.222 0.036 
                    
3 year lag on elderly LFP (50 
obs.) 
-0.236 0.026 0.417  0.034  -0.118  0.031  -0.157  0.013  1.134 0.037 
                    
5 year difference (46 obs.)  -0.735 0.243 0.562  0.193 0.518  0.113  -0.236  0.077  0.840 0.111 
                    
5 year log difference (46 obs.)  -1.148 0.293 0.390  0.165 0.441  0.145  -1.903  0.312  0.407 0.084 
                    
ALL COVARIATES   Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels (54 obs)  -0.201 0.137 0.614  0.082 0.476  0.067  -0.003  0.032  1.225 0.060 
                    
3 year lag on elderly LFP 
(50 obs.) 
-0.055 0.101 0.644  0.104 0.392  0.066  0.007  0.036  1.379 0.071 
                    
5 year difference (46 obs.)  -0.629 0.301 0.460  0.189 0.475  0.183  -0.198  0.075  0.288 0.082 
                    
5 year log difference (46 obs.)  -1.858 0.356 0.610  0.144 0.394  0.208  -1.808  0.333  0.149 0.045 
ALL COVARIATES without  
school leaving age dummy and 
contractual wage 
Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels (54 obs.)  -0.306 0.208 0.597  0.098 0.467  0.065  -0.052  0.030  1.224 0.053 
                    
3 year lag on elderly LFP (50 
obs.) 
0.310  0.168 0.395  0.135 0.372  0.070  -0.056  0.036  1.366 0.060 
                    
5 year difference (46 obs.)  -1.410 0.301 0.615  0.164 0.478  0.141  -0.383  0.069  0.364 0.069 
                    
5 year log difference (46 obs.)  -1.975 0.370 0.595  0.141 0.370  0.207  -2.268  0.417  0.081 0.042   35
 
SELECTED COVARIATES  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels (54 obs.)  -0.283 0.131 0.508  0.102 0.443  0.069  -0.032  0.044  1.240 0.062 
                    
3 year lag on elderly LFP (50 
obs.) 
-0.103 0.141 0.381  0.138 0.386  0.075  0.037  0.050  1.241 0.085 
                    
5 year difference (46 obs.)  -1.372 0.266 0.681  0.146 0.474  0.147  -0.413  0.072  0.377 0.068 
                    
5 year log difference (46 obs.)  -1.735 0.364 0.627  0.131 0.341  0.194  -2.247  0.387  0.126 0.044 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Unemployment and employment of young and prime age,  
Percentage of people in school of young people  
 
ALL COVARIATES:  
- Year (not in the 5 years difference case),  
- gender (not in the NO COVARIATES case), 
- GDP per capita/1000,  
- GDP growth (not in the difference case), 
- percentage of people in school,  
- share of industry in the GDP,  
- median wage/1000,  
- contractual wage/1000,  
- dummy for changes in the compulsory school leaving age (dropped in the 5 years log difference case). 
 
SELECTED COVARIATES:  
- GDP per capita/1000,  
- GDP growth (not in the difference case),  
- share of industry in the GDP 
- gender 
 
SPECIFICATION OF REGRESSIONS: 
 
Levels: Y= employment of old + year + gdp per capita + ...+ gender 
3 yea lag on elderly employment:  Y= employment of old [n-3] + year + gdp per capita + ...+ gender 
5 year difference: Y-Y[n-5]= (employment of old -employment of old [n-5]) +  (gdp per capita-gdp per capita [n-5]) + ...+ gender 
5 year log difference: Y-Y[n-5]= [log (employment of old )-log(employment of old [n-5])] +  [log(gdp per capita)-log(gdp per capita [n-5])] + ...+ 
gender   36
Table 2C. DIRECT EFFECT OF LFP OF THE OLD 
 
POOLED GENDERS -  REGIONAL VARIATION (North West of Italy as benchmark) 
 
  Table 1A: Direct effect of elderly LFP on young and prime age 
  Youth (20-24)  Prime Age (25-54) 
 UR  ER  School  UR  ER 
  Pooled- Regional Variability  Pooled-Regional Variability 
NO COVARIATES  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels (140 obs.)  -0.783 0.201 1.334  0.129  -0.531  0.096  -0.490  0.088  -0.539  0.087 
                    
3 year lag on elderly LFP (125 
obs.) 
-0.042 0.189 1.153  0.133  -0.662  0.098  -0.352  0.086  -0.600  0.072 
                    
5 year difference (115 obs.)  -1.625 0.235 0.774  0.194  -0.007  0.178  -0.477  0.071  0.452 0.081 
                    
5 year log difference (115 obs.)  -2.295 0.346 0.657  0.168  -0.025  0.129  -2.521  0.321  0.219 0.041 
                    
ALL COVARIATES   Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels (135 obs)  -0.800 0.171 0.423  0.135  -0.076  0.194  -0.192  0.055  0.261 0.073 
                    
3 year lag on elderly LFP 
(125 obs.) 
0.236 0.218  -0.332 0.184  0.303  0.244  0.042  0.077  -0.218  0.099 
                    
5 year difference (115 obs.)  -0.873 0.203 0.424  0.171 0.089  0.219  -0.286  0.060  0.255 0.070 
                    
5 year log difference (115 obs.)  -2.461 0.345 0.918  0.137 0.134  0.206  -2.737  0.328  0.279 0.036 
ALL COVARIATES without  
school leaving age dummy and 
contractual wage 
Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels (135 obs.)  -1.632 0.199 0.866  0.134  -0.010  0.165  -0.330  0.064  0.361 0.074 
                    
3 year lag on elderly LFP (125 
obs.) 
0.049 0.339  -0.255 0.240  0.311  0.240  0.095  0.104  -0.268  0.116 
                    
5 year difference (115 obs.)  -1.821 0.208 0.036  0.007 0.094  0.175  -0.513  0.067  0.501 0.073 
                    
5 year log difference (115 obs.)  -2.495 0.347 0.890  0.144 0.131  0.205  -2.785  0.336  0.262 0.037   37
 
SELECTED COVARIATES  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels (135 obs.)  -1.374 0.333 0.669  0.205  -0.024  0.169  -0.311  0.147  0.334 0.134 
                    
3 year lag on elderly LFP (125 
obs.) 
-0.119 0.464 -0.442 0.307 0.378  0.242  -0.032  0.210  -0.166  0.190 
                    
5 year difference (115 obs.)  -1.845 0.210 0.916  0.172 0.098  0.177  -0.523  0.065  0.498 0.073 
                    
5 year log difference (115 obs.)  -2.548 0.353 0.915  0.148 0.098  0.205  -2.760  0.327  0.278 0.038 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Unemployment and employment of young and prime age,  
Percentage of people in school of young people  
 
ALL COVARIATES:  
- Year (not in the 5 years difference case),  
- regional dummies, 
- GDP per capita/1000,  
- GDP growth (not in the difference case), 
- percentage of people in school,  
- share of industry in the GDP,  
- median wage/1000,  
- contractual wage/1000,  
- dummy for changes in the compulsory school leaving age (dropped in the 5 years log difference case). 
 
SELECTED COVARIATES:  
- GDP per capita/1000,  
- GDP growth (not in the difference case),  
- share of industry in the GDP 
- regional dummies 
 
SPECIFICATION OF REGRESSIONS: 
 
Levels: Y= lfp of old + year + gdp per capita + ...+ gender 
3 yea lag on elderly employment:  Y= lfp of old [n-3] + year + gdp per capita + ...+ gender 
5 year difference: Y-Y[n-5]= (lfp-lfp of old [n-5]) +  (gdp per capita-gdp per capita [n-5]) + ...+ gender 
5 year log difference: Y-Y[n-5]= [log (lfp )-log(lfp [n-5])] +  [log(gdp per capita)-log(gdp per capita [n-5])] + ...+ gender 
   38
TABLE 3 
EFFECT OF INCENTIVES ON  LFP OF THE OLD AND ON EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT AND IN-SCHOOL POPULATION 
OF THE YOUNG. 
 
POOLED GENDERS – DIFFERENT VALUES OF ALPHA AND GAMMA  (N=28) 
 ALPHA = 1.50, NO LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS  
  Youth (20-24)  Old (50-64) 
 UR  ER  School  LFP   
  Pooled 
NO COVARIATES  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels   0.050 0.006  -0.042  0.011  0.037  0.009  -0.021  0.003 
                
3 year lag of incentive   0.034 0.006  -0.052  0.008  0.021  0.007  -0.017  0.003 
                
5 year difference  0.041 0.014  -0.001  0.013  0.005  0.010  -0.021  0.006 
                
5 year log difference  0.335 0.084 0.014  0.055  0.134  0.052  -0.075  0.028 
                
ALL COVARIATES without  
school leaving age dummy and 
contractual wage 
Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels   0.082 0.015  -0.025  0.015  0.001  0.011  -0.036  0.010 
                
3 year lag of incentive  0.075 0.020  -0.042  0.015  0.004  0.012  -0.042  0.011 
                
5 year difference  0.067 0.009  -0.027  0.004  0.010  0.008  -0.058  0.009 
                
5 year log difference  0.691 0.083  -0.231  0.033  0.207  0.066  -0.091  0.024 
SELECTED COVARIATES  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels   0.040 0.009  -0.002  0.010  -0.001  0.007  -0.022  0.004 
                
3 year lag of  incentives  0.036 0.009  -0.014  0.011  -0.012  0.005  -0.025  0.004 
                
5 year difference  0.054 0.010  -0.015  0.008  0.010  0.008  -0.026  0.005 
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ALPHA = 1.50, LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS  
(SSW=0 BEFORE ELIGIBILITY; W-PV=0 BEFORE ELIGIBILITY) 
  Youth (20-24)  Old (50-64) 
 UR  ER  School  LFP   
  Pooled 
NO COVARIATES  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels   0.123 0.015  -0.106  0.028  0.111  0.019  -0.045  0.009 
                
3 year lag of incentives  0.078 0.016  -0.111  0.025  0.054  0.018  -0.036  0.009 
                
5 year difference  0.110 0.030 0.001  0.030  0.046  0.021  -0.041  0.016 
                
5 year log difference  0.432 0.105 0.025  0.070  0.230  0.057  -0.077  0.038 
                
ALL COVARIATES without  
school leaving age dummy and 
contractual wage 
Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels   0.151 0.028  -0.020  0.030  0.006  0.021  -0.053  0.022 
                
3 year lag of incentives  0.146 0.057  -0.051  0.043  0.010  0.029  -0.086  0.032 
                
5 year difference  0.180 0.008  -0.061  0.011  0.038  0.017  -0.053  0.018 
                
5 year log difference  0.975 0.098  -0.230  0.070  0.296  0.072  -0.067  0.036 
SELECTED COVARIATES  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels   0.118 0.022  0.0005  0.027  0.020  0.019  -0.056  0.013 
                
3 year lag of incentives  0.066 0.027  -0.001  0.029  -0.037  0.012  -0.050  0.014 
                
5 year difference  0.137 0.019  -0.021  0.019  0.039  0.016  -0.055  0.012 
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ALPHA = -0.248 GAMMA=0.299, NO LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS 
  Youth (20-24)  Old (50-64) 
 UR  ER  School  LFP   
  Pooled 
NO COVARIATES  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels   0.528 0.058  -0.516  0.104  0.454  0.081  -0.208  0.033 
                
3 year lag of incentives  0.345 0.063  -0.565  0.078  0.260  0.070  -0.160  0.036 
                
5 year difference  0.523 0.168  -0.005  0.161  0.087  0.120  -0.256  0.080 
                
5 year log difference  0.691 0.173 0.028  0.113  0.250  0.111  -0.159  0.058 
                
ALL COVARIATES without  
school leaving age dummy and 
contractual wage 
Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels   1.017 0.176  -0.282  0.190  0.013  0.137  -0.437  0.127 
                
3 year lag of incentives  0.935 0.236  -0.501  0.179  -0.007  0.140  -0.533  0.133 
                
5 year difference  0.840 0.102  -0.333  0.047  0.150  0.098  -0.659  0.114 
                
5 year log difference  1.364 0.159  -0.465  0.060  0.383  0.143  -0.196  0.048 
SELECTED COVARIATES  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels   0.521 0.104  -0.030  0.122  0.003  0.088  -0.285  0.051 
                
3 year lag of incentives  0.455 0.112  -0.188  0.134  -0.150  0.064  -0.313  0.052 
                
5 year difference  0.671 0.119  -0.163  0.095  0.150  0.092  -0.316  0.059 
                
5 year log difference  1.110 0.146  -0.273  0.077  0.426  0.105  -0.267  0.052   41
 
ALPHA = -0.547 GAMMA= 0.713, LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS (SSW=0 BEFORE ELIGIBILITY; W-PV=0 
BEFORE ELIGIBILITY) 
  Youth (20-24)  Old (50-64) 
 UR  ER  School  LFP   
  Pooled 
NO COVARIATES  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels   0.438 0.047  -0.434  0.084  0.398  0.062  -0.166  0.028 
                
3 year lag of incentives  0.282 0.054  -0.460  0.069  0.221  0.057  -0.128  0.031 
                
5 year difference  0.470 0.138 0.005  0.136  0.125  0.099  -0.208  0.069 
                
5 year log difference  2.098 0.491 0.069  0.331  0.636  0.334  -0.483  0.167 
                
ALL COVARIATES without  
school leaving age dummy and 
contractual wage 
Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels   0.798 0.137  -0.167  0.152  0.022  0.107  -0.312  0.104 
                
3 year lag of incentives  0.736 0.215  -0.351  0.164  0.020  0.120  -0.424  0.120 
                
5 year difference  0.758 0.062  -0.284  0.040  0.148  0.079  -0.402  0.095 
                
5 year log difference  3.871 0.319  -1.261  0.160  0.842  0.454  -0.599  0.141 
SELECTED COVARIATES  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels   0.474 0.089  -0.019  0.108  0.003  0.088  -0.247  0.047 
                
3 year lag of incentives  0.359 0.101  -0.114  0.117  -0.135  0.054  -0.251  0.049 
                
5 year difference  0.594 0.091  -0.123  0.081  0.149  0.075  -0.263  0.050 
                
5 year log difference  3.531 0.335  -0.908  0.212  1.105  0.345  -0.860  0.137   42
 
ALPHA = 0.0, NO LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS 
  Youth (20-24)  Old (50-64) 
 UR  ER  School  LFP   
  Pooled 
NO COVARIATES  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels   0.156 0.017  -0.152  0.031  0.134  0.024  -0.061  0.010 
                
3 year lag of incentives  0.102 0.019  -0.167  0.023  0.077  0.021  -0.047  0.011 
                
5 year difference  0.154 0.050  -0.001  0.048  0.025  0.035  -0.076  0.023 
                
5 year log difference  0.685 0.172 0.028  0.112  0.248  0.110  -0.158  0.057 
                
ALL COVARIATES without  
school leaving age dummy and 
contractual wage 
Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels   0.300 0.052  -0.083  0.056  0.004  0.040  -0.129  0.037 
                
3 year lag of incentives  0.275 0.070  -0.148  0.053  -0.002  0.041  -0.157  0.039 
                
5 year difference  0.247 0.030  -0.098  0.014  0.044  0.029  -0.195  0.033 
                
5 year log difference  1.350 0.158  -0.460  0.059  0.379  0.142  -0.194  0.048 
SELECTED COVARIATES  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels   0.153 0.031  -0.009  0.036  0.001  0.026  -0.084  0.015 
                
3 year lag of incentives  0.134 0.033  -0.055  0.040  -0.044  0.019  -0.092  0.015 
                
5 year difference  0.198 0.035  -0.048  0.028  0.044  0.027  -0.093  0.017 
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ALPHA = 0.0, LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS  
(SSW=0 BEFORE ELIGIBILITY; W-PV=0 BEFORE ELIGIBILITY) 
  Youth (20-24)  Old (50-64) 
 UR  ER  School  LFP   
  Pooled 
NO COVARIATES  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels   0.402 0.049  -0.363  0.089  0.381  0.058  -0.143  0.030 
                
3 year lag of incentives  0.251 0.055  -0.371  0.081  0.190  0.058  -1.112  0.031 
                
5 year difference  0.361 0.105 0.018  0.104  0.161  0.070  -0.130  0.056 
                
5 year log difference  0.693 0.168 0.046  0.111  0.355  0.094  -0.121  0.061 
                
ALL COVARIATES without  
school leaving age dummy and 
contractual wage 
Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels   0.514 0.099  -0.060  0.105  0.016  0.072  -0.175  0.075 
                
3 year lag of incentives  0.438 0.202  -0.120  0.148  0.058  0.097  -0.264  0.112 
                
5 year difference  0.624 0.031  -0.205  0.039  0.139  0.057  -0.161  0.062 
                
5 year log difference  1.464 0.164  -0.325  0.111  0.447  0.123  -0.098  0.060 
SELECTED COVARIATES  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels   0.410 0.082 0.012  0.096  0.001  0.026  -0.191  0.047 
                
3 year lag of incentives  0.219 0.096 0.007  0.100  -0.124  0.043  -0.166  0.050 
                
5 year difference  0.461 0.070  -0.063  0.065  0.140  0.055  -0.181  0.044 
                
5 year log difference  0.967 0.148  -0.172  0.081  0.429  0.085  -0.198  0.057 
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NOTE: 
I-bar is divided by 100000 
 
ALL COVARIATES:  
- Year (not in the 5 years difference case),  
- GDP per capita/1000,  
- GDP per capita growth (not in the difference case), 
- percentage of people in school,  
- share of industry in the GDP,  
- median wage/1000,  
- contractual wage/1000,  
- dummy for changes in the compulsory school leaving age (dropped in the 5 years log difference case) 
 
SELECTED COVARIATES:  
- GDP per capita,  
- GDP per capita growth (not in the difference case),  
- share of industry in the GDP 
 
SPECIFICATION OF REGRESSIONS: 
Levels: Y= I + year + gdp per capita + ... 
3 yea lag of incentives:  Y= I [n-3] + year + gdp per capita + ... 
5 year difference: Y-Y[n-5]= I([n-5]) +  (gdp per capita-gdp per capita [n-5]) + ... 
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Figure A2: Prevalence of a secondary degree (diploma) or university degree (laurea) or work for 
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Figure A3: Prevalence of a secondary degree (diploma) or university degree (laurea) or work for 
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Figure A5 Impulse response function of the activity rate of the old (AR3) and the unemployment 
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Figure A6 Impulse response function of the activity rate of the old (AR3) and unemployment rate 
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The Impulse response function, computed after running a VAR regression, shows the change over time 
of the variables UR1(unemployment young), or AR3(Activity old), in response to a one-time impulse 
of the variables GDP per capita or GDP growth. This is done keeping all the other variables of the 
VAR regression constant. 
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 A1 EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LEGISLATION Index 
 
 
           Table A1 – Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1999 
16 








dismissals  Vers. 1  Vers. 2 
  Late 80s  Late 90s  Late 80s  Late 90s  Late 90s  Late 80s  Late 90s  Late 90s 
France 2,3 2,3 3,1 3,6  2,1  2,7 3,0 2,8 
Germany 2,7  2,8  3,8  2,3  3,1  3,2  2,5  2,6 
Italy 
18  2,8  2,8  5,4  3,8  4,1  4,1 (1)  3,3 (3)  3,4 (3) 
Spain 3,9  2,6  3,5  3,5  3,1  3,7  3,1  0,1 
UK 0,8  0,8  0,3  0,3  2,9  0,5  0,5  0,9 
 
   
              Table A2 – Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2004 







dismissals  Vers. 1  Vers. 2 
  Late 80s  Late 90s 2003  Late 80s Late 90s 2003  Late 90s 2003  Late 80s Late 90s 2003  Late 90s 2003 
France  2,3 2,3 2,5 3,1 3,6 3,6 2,1 2,1 2,7 3,0 3,0 2,8 2,9 
Germany  2,6 2,7 2,7 3,8 2,3 1,8 3,5 3,8 3,2 2,5 2,2 2,6 2,5 
Italy  1,8 1,8 1,8 5,4 3,6 2,1 4,9 4,9  3,6 (3)  2,7 (4)  1,9 (11)  3,1 (3)  2,4 (9) 
Spain  3,9 2,6 2,6 3,8 3,3 3,5 3,1 3,1 3,8 2,9 3,1 3,0 3,1 
UK  0,9 0,9 1,1 0,3 0,3 0,4 2,9 2,9 0,6 0,6 0,7 1,0 1,1 
 
                                                 
16 In the Employment Outlook 1999 the Regular Employment  index for Italy is based also on the TFR (severance payment)  which is 
regarded as “employment protection”. In the 2004 Table  the  TFR is excluded. 
17 Version 1 excludes collective dismissal. 
18 In the Overall index for Italy the ranking vis-a-vis the other EU12-countries is in parentheses.  Position 1 is the highest level of workers’ 
protection.. 




DIRECT EFFECT OF ELDERLY LFP ON UNEMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT OF YOUNG AND PRIME AGE GROUPS. 
DIRECT EFFECT OF ELDERLY LFP ON SCHOOLING PARTECIPATION OF YOUNGER AGE GROUP 
 
POOLED GENDERS – National Level Data 
 
  Direct effect of elderly Employment rate on young and prime age 
  Youth (20-24)  Prime Age (25-54) 
 UR  ER  School  UR  ER 
  Pooled  Pooled 
ALL COVARIATES   Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels (27 obs.)                  
LFP  Old  -2.706 0.458 0.477  0.363 1.176  0.619  -0.619  0.072  0.559 0.115 
Year 0.021  0.007  -0.022  0.006  -0.002  0.011  0.007  0.001  -0.006  0.002 
GDP per capita /1000  -0.075  0.023  0.041  0.019  0.030  0.034  -0.017  0.003  0.024  0.005 
GDP per capita growth  -0.079  0.310  -0.429  0.246  -0.182  0.456  -0.031  0.076  -0.042  0.121 
People in school  0.638  0.159  0.282  0.126  -  -  -0.053  0.254  -0.482  0.405 
Age end compulsory education  0.001  0.020  -0.027  0.016  0.042  0.028  0.003  0.004  -0.005  0.006 
Median Wage/1000  0.018  0.009  0.014  0.007  -0.009  0.013  0.001  0.002  -0.005  0.003 
Contractual wage/1000  0.002  0.003  -0.002  0.002  -0.007  0.004  0.0005  0.0005  -0.002  0.001 
Share of industry on GDP  2.761  1.332  -0.956  1.056  -2.071  1.910  1.083  0.258  -0.999  0.412 
R^2  0.9555    0.9834    0.8923   0.9928   0.9744   
                    
5 year difference (23 obs.)                  
LFP  Old  -2.794 0.308 0.935  0.260 0.837  0.496  -0.527  0.066  0.451 0.109 
GDP per capita /1000  -0.116  0.022  0.100  0.018  -0.004  0.038  -0.016  0.003  0.028  0.005 
People in school  0.510  0.143  0.429  0.121  -  -  -0.259  0.174  0.052  0.289 
Age end compulsory education  -0.002  0.014  -0.004  0.012  0.028  0.024  0.007  0.004  -0.011  0.007 
Median  Wage/1000  0.035  0.008  -0.004  0.007  -0.002  0.014 0.0004 0.002  0.006  0.003 
Contractual  wage/1000  -0.002  0.003  -0.001  0.002  -0.005  0.005 -0.0002 0.001  -0.003  0.001 
Share of industry on GDP  4.398  0.951  -3.126  0.804  -1.493  1.624  1.220  0.237  -1.105  0.393 
R^2  0.9512    0.9444    0.5550   0.9714   0.9453     53
 
ALL COVARIATES without  
school leaving age dummy and 
contractual wage 
Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels (27 obs.)                  
LFP  Old  -2.758 0.201 1.071  0.177 0.501  0.309  -0.653  0.056  0.597 0.108 
Year 0.022  0.005  -0.030  0.004  0.009  0.008  0.008  0.001  -0.006  0.001 
GDP per capita /1000  -0.077  0.014  0.067  0.012  -0.009  0.023  -0.018  0.002  0.024  0.004 
GDP per capita growth  -0.178  0.204  -0.044  0.180  -0.004  0.333  -0.059  0.073  -0.025  0.139 
People in school  0.604  0.137  0.259  0.121  -  -  0.034  0.253  -0.585  0.485 
Median Wage/1000  0.020  0.005  0.003  0.005  -0.003  0.009  0.002  0.001  -0.0005  0.002 
Share of industry on GDP  3.102  0.676  -2.805  0.596  -0.667  1.094  1.276  0.194  -1.434  0.372 
R^2  0.9540    0.9788    0.8653   0.9919   0.9587   
                    
5 year difference (23 obs.)                  
LFP  Old  -2.769 0.179 0.997  0.150 0.389  0.312  -0.613  0.040  0.527 0.077 
GDP per capita /1000  -0.113  0.017  0.104  0.014  -0.029  0.030  -0.020  0.002  0.028  0.004 
People in school  0.526  0.129  0.432  0.109  -  -  -0.147  0.162  -0.116  0.316 
Median Wage/1000  0.031  0.007  -0.007  0.005  -0.0002  0.012  0.002  0.001  -0.0002  0.002 
Share of industry on GDP  3.999  0.623  -3.487  0.522  -0.955  1.111  1.447  0.160  -1.862  0.311 
R^2  0.9489    0.9426    0.4995   0.9664   0.9110   
                    
SELECTED COVARIATES   Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err  Coeff  St.Err 
Levels (27 obs.)                  
LFP  Old  -2.250 0.333 1.058  0.410 0.540  0.319  -0.662  0.096  0.585 0.119 
GDP per capita /1000  -0.007  0.003  -0.010  0.004  0.014  0.003  0.002  0.001  0.008  0.001 
GDP per capita growth  -0.332  0.364  0.227  0.448  -0.102  0.349  -0.163  0.105  0.170  0.131 
Share of industry on GDP  0.190  0.904  -0.257  1.112  -1.552  0.866  0.517  0.261  -1.146  0.324 
R^2  0.8269    0.8447    0.8344   0.9407   0.8726   
                    
5 year difference (23 obs.)                  
LFP  Old  -2.276 0.277 1.099  0.182 0.388  0.285  -0.628  0.044  0.525 0.073 
GDP per capita /1000  -0.056  0.011  0.075  0.007  -0.029  0.012  -0.016  0.002  0.029  0.003 
Share of industry on GDP  1.743  0.840  -3.499  0.551  -0.944  0.864  1.245  0.132  -1.944  0.221 
R^2  0.8305    0.8836    0.4995   0.9536   0.9102   
 